Editing Political aspects of Islam (section)

====Separation of powers====
{{Further|Islam and secularism|Islamic ethics}}

In the early Islamic caliphates, the caliph was the [[head of state]], and had a position based on the notion of a successor to Muhammad's political authority, who, according to [[Sunni Islam|Sunnī Muslims]], were ideally elected by the people or their representatives,<ref>''Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World'' (2004), vol. 1, p. 116-123.</ref> as was the case for the election of [[Abu Bakr|Abū Bakr]] (632–634), [[Uthman ibn Affan|ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān]] (644–656), and [[Ali|ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib]] (656–661). After the ''rāshidūn'' caliphs, later caliphates during the [[Islamic Golden Age]] had a much lesser degree of democratic participation, but since "no one was superior to anyone else except on the basis of piety and virtue" in Islam, and following the example of Muhammad, later Islamic rulers often held [[public consultation]]s with the people in their affairs.<ref>{{cite book|title=Justice Without Frontiers|first=Christopher G.|last=Judge Weeramantry|year=1997|publisher=[[Brill Publishers]]|isbn=90-411-0241-8|pages=135}}</ref>

The legislative power of the caliph (or later, the [[sultan]]) was always restricted by the scholarly class, the ''[[ulama]]'', a group regarded as the guardians of [[Sharia|Islamic law]]. Since the ''sharia'' law was established and regulated by the [[Madhhab|schools of Islamic jurisprudence]], this prevented the caliph from dictating legal results. ''Sharia''-compliant rulings were established as authoritative based on the ''[[ijma]]'' (consensus) of legal Muslim scholars, who theoretically acted as representatives of the entire ''[[Ummah]]'' (Muslim community).<ref name=Feldman2008>{{cite news |last=Feldman |first=Noah |date=March 16, 2008 |title=Why Shariah? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html?&pagewanted=all |newspaper=The New York Times |access-date=2008-10-05}}</ref> After law colleges (''[[madrasa]]'') became widespread beginning with the 11th and 12th century CE, students of Islamic jurisprudence often had to obtain an ''[[Ijazah|ijaza-t al-tadris wa-l-ifta]]'' ("license to teach and issue legal opinions") in order to issue valid legal rulings.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Makdisi |first=George |date=April–June 1989 |title=Scholasticism and Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West |journal=Journal of the American Oriental Society |volume=109 |issue=2 |pages=175–182 [175–77] |doi=10.2307/604423|jstor=604423 }}</ref> In many ways, classical Islamic law functioned like a [[constitutional law]].<ref name=Feldman2008/>

Practically, for hundreds of years after the fall of the [[Rashidun Caliphate|Rāshidūn Caliphate]] (7th century CE) and until the first half of the 20th century, [[Muslim-majority countries]] usually adopted a system of government based on the coexistence of the [[sultan]] and ''[[ulama]]'' which followed the rules of the ''sharia'' law. This system resembled to some extent some Western governments in possessing an [[unwritten constitution]] (like the [[United Kingdom]]), and possessing separate, countervailing branches of government (like the [[United States]]), which provided a clear [[separation of powers]] in socio-political governance. While the United States and some other systems of government have [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|three separate branches of government]]—executive, legislative, and judicial—Islamic monarchies had two: the sultan and the ''ulama''.<ref name=feldman-fall-6>Feldman, Noah, ''Fall and Rise of the Islamic State'', Princeton University Press, 2008, p.6</ref>

According to the French political scientist and professor [[Olivier Roy (professor)|Olivier Roy]], this "''de facto'' separation between political power" of sultans and emirs and religious power of the caliph was "created and institutionalized ... as early as the end of the first century of [[Islamic calendar|the hegira]]." The sovereign's religious function was to defend the Muslim community against its enemies, institute the sharia, ensure the public good (''maslaha''). The state was instrument to enable Muslims to live as good Muslims and Muslims were to obey the [[sultan]] if he did so. The legitimacy of the ruler was "symbolized by the right to coin money and to have the Friday prayer (''[[Jumu'ah]] [[khutba]]'') said in his name."<ref>Roy, Olivier, ''The Failure of Political Islam'' by Olivier Roy, translated by Carol Volk, Harvard University Press, 1994, p.14-15</ref>

British lawyer and journalist [[Sadakat Kadri]] argues that a large "degree of deference" was shown to the caliphate by the ulama and this was at least at times "counterproductive". "Although jurists had identified conditions from mental incapacity to blindness that could disqualify a caliph, none had ever dared delineate the powers of the caliphate as an institution."  During the Abbasid caliphate:

<blockquote>When Caliph [[Al-Mutawakkil]] had been killed in 861, jurists had retroactively validated his murder with a [[fatwa]]. Eight years later, they had testified to the lawful abdication of a successor, after he had been dragged from a toilet, beaten unconscious, and thrown into a vault to die. By the middle of the tenth century, judges were solemnly confirming that the onset of blindness had disqualified a caliph, without mentioning that they had just been assembled to witness the gouging of his eyes.<ref name=kadri-120-1>{{cite book|last1=Kadri|first1=Sadakat|title=Heaven on Earth: A Journey Through Shari'a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia ...|date=2012|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=9780099523277|pages=120–1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ztCRZOhJ10wC&pg=PT127}}</ref>
</blockquote>

According to [[Noah Feldman]], law professor at [[Harvard University]], the Muslim legal scholars and jurists lost their control over Islamic law due to the [[Codification (law)|codification]] of ''sharia'' by the [[Ottoman Empire]] in the early 19th century:<ref name=Feldman-why>{{Cite web|author=Noah Feldman|title=Why Shariah?|work=[[New York Times]]|date=March 16, 2008|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html?ei=5070&em=&en=5c1b8de536ce606f&ex=1205812800&pagewanted=all|access-date=2008-10-05}}</ref>

{{Blockquote|How the scholars lost their exalted status as keepers of the law is a complex story, but it can be summed up in the adage that partial reforms are sometimes worse than none at all. In the early 19th century, the Ottoman empire responded to military setbacks with an internal reform movement. The most important reform was the attempt to codify Shariah. This Westernizing process, foreign to the Islamic legal tradition, sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book. [...] Once the law existed in codified form, however, the law itself was able to replace the scholars as the source of authority. Codification took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law and transferred that power to the state.}}