Jump to content
Main menu
Main menu
move to sidebar
hide
Navigation
Main page
Recent changes
Random page
Help about MediaWiki
Search
Search
Create account
Log in
Personal tools
Create account
Log in
Pages for logged out editors
learn more
Contributions
Talk
Editing
Political aspects of Islam
(section)
Page
Discussion
English
Read
Edit
Edit source
View history
Tools
Tools
move to sidebar
hide
Actions
Read
Edit
Edit source
View history
General
What links here
Related changes
Special pages
Page information
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
====Shīʿa—Sunnī differences==== {{Main|Shia–Sunni relations}} {{Further|Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict|Sectarian violence among Muslims}} According to the [[Iranian-American]] academic [[Vali Nasr]], which serves as Majid Khaddouri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at the [[Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies]] (SAIS), political tendencies of [[Shia Islam|Shīʿa]] and [[Sunni Islam|Sunnī]] Islamic ideologies differ, with [[Islamic fundamentalism|Sunnī fundamentalism]] "in [[Pakistan]] and much of the [[Arab world]]" being "far from politically revolutionary", primarily focused on attempting to [[Islamization|Islamicize]] the political establishment rather than trying to change it through revolutionary struggle, whereas the Shīʿīte conception of [[political Islam]] is strongly influenced by [[Ruhollah Khomeini]] and his talk of the oppression of the poor and class war, which characterized the success of the [[Islamic Revolution]] in [[Iran]] (1978–1979):<ref name="Nasr 2007" /> {{Blockquote |text=With the [[Iranian Revolution|Shia awakening of Iran]], the years of sectarian tolerance were over. What followed was a Sunni-versus-Shia contest for dominance, and it grew intense. [...] The revolution even moved leftists in [[Muslim-majority countries]] such as [[Indonesia]], [[Turkey]], and [[Lebanon]] to look at Islam with renewed interest. After all, in Iran, Islam had succeeded where leftist ideologies had failed. [...] But admiration for what had happened in Iran did not equal acceptance of Iranian leadership. Indeed, Islamic activists outside of Iran quickly found Iranian revolutionaries to be arrogant, offputting, and drunk on their own success. Moreover, [[Islamic fundamentalism|Sunni fundamentalism]] in [[Pakistan]] and much of the [[Arab world]] was far from politically revolutionary. It was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values. As the French scholar of contemporary Islam [[Gilles Kepel]] puts it, it was less to tear down the existing system than to give it a fresh, thick coat of "Islamic green" paint. [[Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]]'s [[Islamic fundamentalism in Iran|fundamentalism]], by contrast, was "red"—that is, genuinely revolutionary.<ref name="Nasr 2007" /> }} The American [[political analyst]] and author [[Graham E. Fuller]], specialized in the study of [[Islamism]] and [[Islamic extremism]], has also noted that he found "no mainstream Islamist organization (with the exception of [Shīʿa] Iran) with radical social views or a revolutionary approach to the social order apart from the imposition of legal justice."<ref>Fuller, Graham E., ''The Future of Political Islam'', Palgrave MacMillan, (2003), p.26</ref>
Summary:
Please note that all contributions to Salaafipedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here.
You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see
Salafipedia:Copyrights
for details).
Do not submit copyrighted work without permission!
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)
Toggle limited content width